I appreciated the comments by G. L. Burns (2000) that were the operational criteria. The optimal internal properties of a mea prompted by our article describing the structure of psychopathic sure are not universal for all constructs but are determined by this traits in two samples of children (Frick, Bodin, & Barry, 2000) , theoretical context Burns's analysis illustrates this problem. It Burns's comments focus on the Psychopathy Screening Device operates under the assumption that the PSD criteria, in order to (PSD; Frick & Hare, in press), a tool that we used in this and other assess psychopathy adequately, should be completely independent studies to assess these traits in children. Burns makes several very of DSM criteria. In the following paragraphs, I try to provide a important points in his comments. First, the PSD is clearly in a more detailed description of the conceptual framework for the very early stage of development and, as Burns points out, much construct being measured by the PSD, which illustrates that this more information is needed on its construct validity for its clinical assumption is inconsistent with its theoretical foundations. utility to be fully evaluated (see also Frick & Hare, in press), Second, one important aspect of this validation is to determine its Psychopathy and DSM Criteria:
relations with other constructs used in the assessment of childhood psychopathology, such as the DSM criteria (American Psychiatric Different Conceptual Foundations Association, 1980 , 1987 , 1994 , which we have tried to do in many Burns (2000) (2000) anal and considers this as the primary conceptual foundation for our ysis is his use of content overlap with DSM criteria as the sole extension of the construct of psychopathy to children. This illus criteria for judging that the content of the PSD "is limited." His trates a confusion over the theoretical formulation and internal comparison of the content of the PSD and the DSM criteria is done validation aspects of construct development. This quote was in without an adequate specification of how the construct of psycho tended to describe the process of operationalizing the construct of pathy, as operationally defined by the PSD, was conceptualized psychopathy, not the conceptualization of psychopathy and its and without any attempt to specify how he is conceptualizing the critical features. One could argue (see, e.g., Lilienfeld & Andrews, construct or constructs that the DSM criteria are attempting to 1996) that the way psychopathy is operationalized by the PCL-R measure, It is a problem that is well articulated by Morey (1991) is flawed and, therefore, using it as a basis for the content of a as a focus on "internal validation" (i.e., how a construct is opera measure designed to study developmental precursors to this con tionalized and its various internal properties) without adequate struct would also be flawed. But this would require a delineation attention to the theoretical formulation that guided the selection of of the conceptual foundations of psychopathy that led to the item content of the PCL-R, and such a delineation was not included in Burns's analysis. In short, the PCL-R content was based on numerous clinical
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